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Introduction
On May 11, 2010, ‘‘a man with explosives strapped to his body blew himself up in a
crowd, bombers struck a southern city and gunmen sprayed fire on security check-
points in attacks that killed at least 100 people—most of them in Shiite areas—in
Iraq’s deadliest day of the year.’’1 Iraq’s former Shi’i Vice President Adel
Abdul-Mahdi called for ‘‘quickly forming a government that does not exclude any
major political group’’ to prevent perpetrators of terrorism from ‘‘exploiting Iraq’s
fragile security.’’2 Efforts to form a coalition government that included religious min-
ority representation in a democratizing and divided Iraq proved futile in the wake of
the March 7, 2010 elections. Prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shi’i bloc chose to
exclude from the coalition another Shi’i leader, Ayad Allawi—a secular politician
supported mainly by Sunnis in the country. Consequentially, Sunni terrorist attacks
increased both in intensity and casualties in the months following the election.3
This story is not very different than that of India or other democracies where
elections, the first and foremost element of liberal democracy, do not necessarily
guarantee the representation of religious minority groups in legislative coalitions
and disgruntled minority groups on occasion resort to violence to voice their polit-
ical demands.4 This article addresses the questions of whether and how a group’s
attributes are related to its propensity for alternative political expression, including
violence. We examine the role of one such attribute—religion—in influencing a
group’s use of violence, specifically terrorism, in democracies worldwide.
Although secularization has been a major trend, especially in industrial and
post-industrial states, ‘‘religion remains more strongly and more consistently related
to voting choice today than any of the various indicators of socioeconomic status.’’5
Nevertheless, there is a dearth of cross-national empirical studies that examine the
relationship between religion and party politics6 especially with respect to the incidence
of political violence.7 Similarly, while the literature on coalition formation is very rich,8
few scholars address the relationship between religion and coalition-formation9
especially as it pertains to the incidence of terrorism and political violence.10
Previous work examining the effect of religion on coalition formation questions
‘‘what effect ethnic minority constituency religion has on the probability that the
minority gets invited to join in an executive coalition’’11 by the majority political
party.12 Findings suggest that in democracies ethnic majority politicians strategically
consider collaboration with ethnic minorities of various religious backgrounds, per-
haps to signal their commitment to diversity. In this article, we build on the argu-
ment that religious minorities are treated differently by the majority parties in
coalition-building. We turn the question on its head and examine the actions taken
by ethnic groups of a different religion than the majority when they are excluded
from government.
One potential political action—the one that we explore in this article—is terror-
ism. Sandler defines terrorism as ‘‘the premeditated use, or threat of use, of
extra-normal violence or brutality to gain a political objective through intimidation
or fear of a targeted audience.’’13 Following Sandler’s definition, we assume that ter-
rorism is one tool that extremist members of ethnic groups can use to influence dom-
estic political incentives to their advantage. Consequently, we argue that when
excluded from coalitions, extremist elements of ethnic minorities may consider
terrorism as one way to press for their policy preferences when these groups are
excluded from the governing coalition.
30 N. S. Satana et al.
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Terrorism is an extreme tool to use in politics. Thus, to mobilize even a segment
of the minority in support of such radical action, extremists may suggest that
exclusion by the majority is not simply routine politics but a more nefarious attempt
at cultural marginalization. Religion is an important and highly salient cultural attri-
bute. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect extremist factions of excluded ethnic
groups to use religious divergence between majorities and minorities to mobilize
minority support for the use of extreme tactics such as terrorism. It is important
to note, however, that we are focusing on the difference in religion and its impact
on choice of political expression when excluded, not on the level of religiosity of
any particular group, majority or minority.
Building on this expectation, we propose some testable hypotheses about the
effect of exclusion of ethnic groups, which are also religious minorities, from govern-
ing coalitions on the probability of terrorist attacks by their extremist elements. We
test our theory on ethnic minority access to legislative coalitions and the incidence of
terrorism across democracies worldwide between 1970 and 2004. To do this, we use
data on government coalitions and religion14 merged with the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) by matching perpetrators of terrorism with ethnic groups for all
democracies worldwide.15 In sum, our empirical results show that the less access
to the government an ethnic group subscribing to a different religion than that of
the majority population has, the more likely its extremist elements are to engage
in terrorism. Importantly, we also find that it is not absolute religious difference that
motivates extreme political action. When excluded from government, ethnic minori-
ties belonging to a different religious denomination or sect than the majority are also
more likely to engage in terrorism as compared to ethnic groups that belong to the
same religion and denomination as the majority.
Literature and Theory
In the first section we examine the role of religion in electoral politics. We then dis-
cuss the strand of the literature on elections, which deals with ethnic minorities and
electoral outcomes as well as resorting to violence. We find that although past work
acknowledges the continued importance of religion on every aspect of electoral poli-
tics from voting to cabinet formation, the existing literature offers little guidance as
to how minority religion might play a role in electorally motivated violence. We then
turn to the terrorism literature, in particular the literature on the fourth wave, which
discusses the role of religion on violence at length. We build on the insights of this
literature regarding the role of religion as an intervening variable in motivating ter-
rorism. Specifically, we use the idea of religion as an institution that is ripe for poli-
ticization to formulate hypotheses regarding the relationship between minority
religion, coalition formation, and terrorism.
Religion, Party Politics, and Coalition Formation
Ernest Gellner posits that apart from societies that are predominantly Muslim, the
‘‘secularization thesis does hold.’’16 On the other hand, according to Norris and
Inglehart, secularization is a myth both earlier in history as ‘‘differences between
Protestants and Catholics in Western Europe functioned as a cognitive shortcut, like
the role of social class which linked voters to parties,’’ and in contemporary world
politics.17 In fact, the literature on electoral politics indicates that religion plays a
Religion, Government Coalitions, and Terrorism 31
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role in the construction of public policy agendas by political parties. Moreover, reli-
gion helps to stabilize votes in maturing democracies in the long run.18 In contrast to
Gellner’s argument, religion still remains an important determinant of voters’ polit-
ical views in highly developed countries such as the United States.19
Green, for instance, examines the relationship between religion and the U.S.
party system in the 1990s and finds that ‘‘religious groups were important elements
of the stable political coalitions that undergird routine politics. In the 1990s, each of
the major parties had strong religious constituencies.’’20 Hence, the Republican
Party was mostly supported by traditionalists, such as Evangelicals, while the Demo-
crats drew support from ethnic and religious minorities. As a result, ‘‘each party was
able to build winning electoral coalitions by reaching beyond its core constitu-
ency.’’21 In line with this argument, the effect of religion on electoral politics and
more specifically coalition politics does not necessarily manifest itself through
‘‘self-identified religious parties.’’ Wittenberg suggests that the impact of religion
in party politics is apparent in the support for secular parties whose constituency
includes religious and ethnic groups.22 Rosenblum agrees that the ‘‘distinction
between religious parties and religious party organizations allied to secular parties
is not crucial, so long as religious political groups are constituent elements of the
party as demonstrated by candidate recruitment, platforms and programs, strategy,
coalition building, and so on.’’23
While this literature concurs with the point of view that religion clearly affects
party politics and coalition formation, few scholars have examined the effect of
religious identity on access to the government.24 Most states in the post-Westphalia
nation-state system are heterogeneous. Accordingly, states that are electoral democ-
racies often include ethnic minority parties whose constituency religion differs from
the religion of the majority.
In a democracy, the expectation is that all minorities have a chance of inclusion
in the government, where they might have a more direct effect on their groups’ socio-
economic and political position. Lijphart argues that power-sharing institutions
increase the accommodation of groups’ interests and prevent conflict.25 Moreover,
Birnir asserts that when the expectation to improve a minority ethnic group’s pos-
ition through access to governing coalitions is unfulfilled, the frustration of a min-
ority may lead to violence.26 Although she does not address the effect of religion
in this equation, many ethnic minorities differ in terms of religious affiliation from
the majority in the country where they reside.
In the following section, we elaborate upon why we expect extremist elements of
minorities whose religion differs from the majority, more than members of other
minority groups, to resort to violence in the form of terrorism when the group is
excluded from direct political access. Building on Rosenblum, we suggest that polit-
ical inclusion of the religiously distinct ethnic minority does not have to occur
through an explicitly religious party. Rather we focus on the religion of the minority
constituency represented by ethnic political parties to understand the role of min-
ority religion in coalition politics. In other words, when a political party appeals
for votes from a particular religious minority (as well as other ethnic groups), we
assume that the party cannot distance itself from the religious beliefs of that con-
stituency. For example, Jammu and Kashmir Democratic People’s Party in India
is an ethnic party that appeals to the ethnic Kashmiri minority; however, it is also
a party that appeals to Muslims in India who are not ethnic Kashmiri. Thus, the
party does not distance itself from the general Muslim population despite its
32 N. S. Satana et al.
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Kashmiri roots. The party gets votes from Muslims, in general, as well as ethnic
Kashmiris, who are also typically Muslim.
Religion, Political Access, and Terrorism
A popular view of the contemporary relationship between religion and terrorism is
the ‘‘new terrorism’’ literature. As summarized by Weinberg, Pedahzur, and
Hirsch-Hoefler citing Rapoport, Hoffman, and others, ‘‘this ‘new’ or fourth wave
of terrorism has been dominated by religious concerns, and especially Islamist
ones.’’27 Moreover, ‘‘by contrast to its predecessor(s), the new terrorists have been
willing to inflict mass casualties, kill large numbers of people, and use or attempt
to use unconventional weapons to achieve this end.’’28
A primordial interpretation of this descriptive relationship is that the immediate
motivations of terror are found in religious doctrine or beliefs.29 According to
Hoffman, for example, ‘‘whereas secular terrorists attempt to appeal to actual and
potential sympathizers, religious terrorists appeal to no other constituency than
themselves,’’ and according to Cronin, ‘‘religious terrorists act directly or indirectly
to please the perceived commands of a deity.’’30 Rapoport adds that ‘‘sacred terror’’
has common characteristics, regardless of how different religions are from each
other.31 In sum, as Hasenclever and Rittberger argue, Primordialists link religious
traditions directly to political conflict.32
An alternative view argues that while religion per se is generally not the cause of
conflict, it adds a troubling dimension to extant conflict. According to Juergensmeyer,
for example, the sources of intergroup tension are usually economic and social in
character; ‘‘at some point in the conflict, however, usually at a time of frustration
and desperation, the political contest becomes religionized. Then what was primarily
a secular struggle takes on the aura of sacred conflict. This creates a whole new set of
problems.’’33 Juergensmeyer adds that all religions, including Christianity, Judaism,
Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism, experience and perpetrate violence. When
the perpetrators of violence perceive themselves and their way of life as under attack,
‘‘an odd attraction between religion and violence’’ emerges.34
Similarly, Fox posits that religion becomes a salient political issue when the
group harbors desires for autonomy or independence.35 Seul and Fox suggest that
religion provides a framework that helps people understand the world around
them.36 Fox further argues that when challenged, the reality provided by this frame-
work must be defended. He also suggests that religious frameworks provide codes of
conduct for adherents. In some cases, these codes are even thought to require con-
flictual behavior by followers. Thus, both Seul and Fox agree that religious institu-
tions may facilitate conflict, and Fox adds that religious authority grants the conflict
legitimacy. Additionally, Stark underscores the strength of the world-shaping view
of religion.37 In sum, these instrumentalist arguments maintain that extremists use
religion as a tool to reach their desired aims.38
In fact, referring specifically to Islam, Sedgwick suggests that while the ultimate
aims of ‘‘new terrorists’’ belonging to the fourth wave, including Al-Qaeda, may be
religious, they are similar to other terrorist groups in that their immediate goals are
political.39 He argues that what distinguishes the constituency of Al-Qaeda from
constituencies of nationalist or leftist movements that must work to encourage
national or class consciousness is that ‘‘an Islamic movement can skip this stage,
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since its chosen constituency—Muslims—is already very conscious of its existence; it
only needs to be made into a political constituency.’’40
Relevant to our research question, the terrorism literature also addresses the role
of political structures in motivating terrorist attacks. For example, it pursues the
issue of whether democracies are more susceptible to terrorism than authoritarian
states,41 whether political parties and elections are related to the incidence of terror-
ism,42 and whether violence is particularly acute around elections.43 Indridason, for
example, argues that terrorism is likely before elections and finds that the 2004
attacks in Spain three days before the Spanish legislative elections led to the demise
of the People’s Party (PP), since people believed that the PP was not able to provide
sufficient security to prevent such attacks.44
Building on Birnir’s argument that ethnic groups will be frustrated when they
are excluded from government,45 we argue that it is not elections per se that lead
to violence. Nor do we argue that minority groups are excluded because of their reli-
gion. Previous research on this topic finds that the content of religion does not mat-
ter for inclusion in legislative coalitions. In fact, minorities that subscribe to a
different religion than the majority are more likely to be invited to join coalitions
than other minorities.46 However, as is the case with other minorities—it stands to
reason that minorities who do not subscribe to the same religion as the majority also
become increasingly ‘‘frustrated’’ after a new coalition that excludes them. Further-
more, governing coalitions tend to change around elections.
Assuming Indridason is correct in that ‘‘terrorism results in the formation of lar-
ger and more ideologically cohesive coalitions,’’47 we expect that some excluded
minorities will consider violence as an effective strategy to influence future coalition
building and thereby their own chances of being included. We posit that for mino-
rities whose religion differs from the majority, resorting to terrorism will be at least
as viable an option to achieve the group’s goals as it is for other excluded minorities.
The question that remains is whether extreme factions within minorities that
diverge in religion from the majority are more likely than are other minorities to
choose terrorism as a strategy. Our argument builds on Juergensmeyer and Sedg-
wick’s idea that although politics are the immediate concern, disgruntled groups
use religion as a tool to mobilize and justify violence.48 Specifically, we suggest that
when excluded from central governance, minority=majority cultural distance pro-
vides the minority group with a uniquely mobilizable platform for radical action.
Such a cultural divide may be linguistic, racial, based on customs, or any other distin-
guishing feature of the ethnic minority group. Generalizing Sedgwick’s insights about
Islam to other religions, we add that a distinct minority religion is perhaps the most
salient of such cultural divides, because it tends to provide a ready issue platform that
does not depend on prior political mobilization. Religion is a divide that can be mobi-
lized politically when needed. On average, therefore, we would expect that the cultural
distance of adhering to a distinct religion improves the mobilizing capabilities for rad-
ical violence by extremists within ethnic minority groups beyond that of minority
groups who share a common religion with the majority. For example, in India, the
now-defunct Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front, an extremist organization within
the Muslim Kashmiri minority group, perpetrated a terrorist attack in 1989 after
Muslim Kashmiris were excluded from the Hindu majority government for several
years. The Hindu majority had been reluctant to include Kashmiri political parties
in the government before the attack and religious extremists used the opportunity
to mobilize violence in support of the Kashmiris’ rights.
34 N. S. Satana et al.
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In this context, it is important to emphasize that the perpetration of terrorist
acts, as opposed to other types of political violence such as guerilla insurgency, gen-
erally requires only a small number of member adherents. Also important, we are
not arguing that minority groups whose religion diverges from the majority are
any more radical than minority groups who share a religion with majorities. In con-
trast, we suggest that divergence in religion provides extremists with an issue plat-
form on which to mobilize for radical action in the context of exclusion. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): When excluded from access to government, extrem-
ist elements of minority ethnic groups that diverge
from the majority population with regard to religi-
on are more likely to perpetrate terrorist attacks
as compared to ethnic groups who share a religion
with the majority group.
Importantly, we would highlight that we are focusing on groups that do have
some level of political representation in the legislature but which are excluded from
the governing coalition. This is relevant because it goes beyond theories, which sug-
gest that the mere granting of political representation should quell political violence.
Our next conjecture delves deeper into the content of the religious divide.
Ben-Dor and Pedahzur show that since the early 1990s the number of terrorist
attacks by Islamist groups roughly follows the pattern by other terrorist groups.49
The number of victims in terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamist groups has, how-
ever, been higher than that of other terrorist groups.50 Ben-Dor and Pedahzur make
the case that this difference is due to the unique characteristics of Islamic terrorist
groups that are not shared by other religiously motivated terrorist groups. Sedgwick,
however, as we already noted, argues that while Islamic terrorists use religion in dis-
tinctive ways to motivate adherents, Islamist terrorists are much like other terrorists
in that their immediate objectives are political.51
We do not attempt to resolve the debate about the uniqueness of Islam with
respect to terrorism here. Rather we hone in further on the theory of political motiv-
ation of extremists that we developed with respect to our first hypothesis. If a min-
ority religion (Islam included) is a readily available platform that can be politicized
by extremists, the next question is what circumstances make the politicization of
religion more or less likely? The politicization of religion resulted in wars between
distinct cultures, which were designated in part on the basis of religious differences.52
In empirical testing, however, this idea has not been borne out either locally or
globally.53
In contrast, Fox found that most religious violence is intra-group instead of
inter-group.54 Building on Fox, we suggest that it is not absolute religious distance
(or difference) between families of religions that engenders the greatest potential for
mobilizing group members for radical action. Instead, we argue that an extreme fac-
tion within an ethnic group that is of a different denomination or sect than the
majority group is more likely to mobilize support for radical action on religious
grounds than is an extremist faction in an ethnic group whose family of religion dif-
fers from the majority. This is because, we assert, non-religious cultural traits often
cut across majority and minorities in groups distinguished by denomination or sect.
Religion, Government Coalitions, and Terrorism 35
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For example, Protestants and Catholics in Ireland share race and language, distin-
guishing themselves primarily by denomination. In contrast, Turks in Germany dif-
fer from the majority by family of religion, race, and language. Consequently, when
alternate cultural issues on which groups may mobilize cut across majority and min-
ority groups, religious differences are likely to come to the fore. Thus, we propose
that:
H2: When excluded from access to government, extremists in ethnic
groups whose religion is the same as the majority but who differ
in denomination or sect, are more likely to perpetrate terrorist
attacks than extremists from ethnic groups whose family of religion
differs from the majority group.
Testing the Effect of Political Access on Terrorism
Ariel Merari once argued, ‘‘As terrorism is not a discipline, there can hardly be a
general theory of terrorism. . . .Precise and extensive factual knowledge is still grossly
lacking. Much effort must still be invested in the very first stage of scientific inquiry
with regard to terrorism—the collection of data.’’55 After more than two decades,
Merari is still right in arguing that comparative cross-national studies that investi-
gate the incidence of terrorism are lacking. The examination of the role that religion
plays in explaining terrorism in present cross-national studies is even more limited.
Our paper begins to address this gap in the existing literature.
Data
In this article, we test the relative effect of access to government on the likelihood of
the use of terrorism by ethnic groups belonging to different religions than the
majority and by ethnic groups belonging to different denominations or sects than
the majority. The ethnicity, religion, and electoral access data we use are pooled
cross-sections from executive election years in all democracies with electorally active
minorities from 1970 to 2004. We use the ‘‘Ethnicity and Electoral Politics’’ dataset56
for ethnic minority access to government and for the operationalization of democ-
racy. Using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) groups, these data record minority group
access to government through ethnic and non-ethnic parties, for all electorally active
ethnic groups, in all democracies since 1945.57 To address criticism of the selection
bias of the MAR groups, Birnir’s Ethnicity and Electoral Politics dataset surveys
all electorally active groups, which passed the population threshold of MAR but that
were missing from the original MAR data. Following that survey, we added coun-
tries to our data for a total of 52 groups in 37 democracies.58 The unit of analysis
is the electorally active ethnic minority in a given country in an election year. For
each country the number of cases per election year equals the number of electorally
active ethnic minority groups in that country. While we have access to electoral data
going back to 1945, the terrorism data begin in 1970. The terrorism data come from
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which includes more than 87,000 terrorist
incidents from 1970–2008. The database includes information about acts of intra-
and inter-state terrorism by perpetrator, location, and year in addition to qualitative
notes further describing the attack. Our main explanatory variables capture how
long it has been since an ethnic minority group with a different religion or a different
36 N. S. Satana et al.
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religious denomination or sect than the majority has had access to the government.
The dependent variable is whether or not elements of that ethnic group have engaged
in terrorism in an election year. A more detailed description of the operationalization
of the variables appears below.
Dependent Variable
Perpetrator’s ethnic group affiliation. This variable is coded through matching
the perpetrator of a terrorist attack in a given year from the GTD with each ethnic
group that is included for a given country every election year. One challenge with
using perpetrator information with regard to terrorism data is that in many cases
the perpetrators are unknown, whether because they want to remain anonymous,
because multiple groups claim responsibility, or because press reporting is unavail-
able or spotty. In the GTD overall, about 40% of the cases contain perpetrator infor-
mation. However, in our sample, the rate of perpetrator identification is 70%. While
we do not examine the reason for this difference, it may be that ethnic minorities in
democracies that commit terrorist acts are more likely to acknowledge that they were
the perpetrators in order to influence the population and the government.
A team of coders examined all of the terrorist events contained in the GTD for
the countries and election years in the Ethnicity and Electoral Politics dataset to
determine whether any of the attacks could be attributed to the minority groups
listed for each country. If so, the observation was coded 1, if not it was coded zero.
A code of zero was also recorded if there was no terrorist attack whatsoever in a
given year. If the perpetrator information was unknown for any of the attacks in
a given year, then the perpetrator’s group affiliation variable was coded as missing,
and the case was excluded from the analysis.
Independent Variables
Ethnic minority access to government. The main explanatory variables were
coded specifically for this analysis and are drawn from two existing datasets. The
first is Birnir’s59 Ethnicity and Electoral Politics dataset described above. We used
her access variable, which measures the number of years since a minority group
was last represented in the executive cabinet by an ethnic party.60 As Birnir
describes, the count ‘‘starts either at democratization . . . or the election in which
the group enters national electoral competition if that occurs later than democratiza-
tion’’ and ‘‘the count is reset to 0 each year the group is represented by the ethnic
party in the cabinet.’’61 Because of these coding rules, the sample is restricted from
the possible 637 observations to 400, about three-fourths of which also have values
for the dependent variable.
The second dataset upon which the primary explanatory variables draw is a
detailed coding of religious minority and majority group creeds and denominations
by Fox.62 We use Birnir and Satana’s63 original contribution to Fox’s coding, which
is to code the context of majority=minority group religious identity combination
variables by country. According to Fox, if 80% of the ethnic minority subscribes
to a different religion than the majority, the ethnic group belongs to a minority
religion and is coded as such. This distinction pertains to both different religious
families and different denominations within the same family. We supplement Fox’s
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data with the World Directory of Minorities64 so that all of the groups in our dataset
are classified.65 The various religions that are included are: Animism, Baha’ism,
Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Shinto,
Sikhism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism.66
We created two dummy variables that indicate whether or not a minority ethnic
group’s religion is the same as the majority religion and, if it is the same, whether or
not the minority group religion belongs to the same religion but a different denomi-
nation or sect than the majority population. For example, in Bulgaria the ethnic
majority is Christian Orthodox while the Muslim=Turkish minority is Sunni Muslim.
Thus, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is coded as belonging to a different religion
than the majority of Bulgarians. On the other hand, Catholics in the U.K. are coded
as belonging to the same religion as the majority Protestants as they are both Chris-
tian denominations.67
In the overall sample, there are 426 cases in which the minority ethnic group is
the same religion as the majority and 211 cases in which it differs. However, once
taking into account the coding restrictions and missing data, for the cases included
in the analysis, there are 195 cases in which the minority and majority ethnic groups
are of the same and 94 in which their religion differs. In addition, there are 72 cases
in which the minority is of the same religion but of a different denomination or sect
than the majority in the sample as a whole; however, only 40 of these cases appear in
the analysis. See the appendix for a list of groups by country and their religious
family and denomination differences from the majority.
Since we want to test the impact of excluding religious minority groups from the
government on their likelihood of engaging in terrorism, we interacted the years
since the group had access to the cabinet through an affiliated ethnic party with each
of the two religious difference variables, separately. Since the religious difference
variables are both binary, we do not encounter the problems with interpretation
associated with continuous interaction terms in logit regressions.68 Our interacted
variables, ‘‘Years religious minority has been out of cabinet’’ and ‘‘Years different
denomination or sect minority has been out of cabinet,’’ denote whether the group
is a religious minority (different religion or same religion, different denomination or
sect) and if so, how many years it has been out of the cabinet. If it is not a religious
minority or it is in the cabinet, it is coded as 0. The maximum length of time out of
the cabinet differs substantially between minorities of a different religion than the
majority (33 years) and minorities of a different denomination than the majority
(57 years). Consequently, we did not standardize the independent variables.
Control Variables
We posit that all ethnic minority groups are constrained by exogenous factors such
as the political institutions and economic conditions of the countries in which they
live. According to Varshney, these control variables account for a large part of
religious grievances and political violence.69 Conversely, Piazza argues that the usual
suspects such as poverty, inequality, and poor economic development are poor pre-
dictors of political violence, specifically terrorism.70 He argues that ‘‘social cleavage’’
theories are more likely to explain the incidence of terrorism. Accordingly, we con-
trol for institutional factors most commonly cited in the literature on ethnic minori-
ties, coalition formation, and terrorism.71 More specifically, we include two variables
accounting for presidential systems and semi-presidential systems, with the reference
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category being parliamentary systems. We also include two electoral variables
accounting for countries that use proportional representation and mixed electoral
systems, with the reference category being plurality or majority electoral systems.72
Similarly, economic prosperity is thought to influence the likelihood of terrorism.73
To measure economic effects we include variables accounting for GDP per capita
and aggregate growth of GDP per capita.74 Finally, because India has several groups
that have engaged in terrorism among the cases in the dataset, Sri Lanka has had a
particularly active violent ethnic group of a different religion than the majority and
the United Kingdom also had a particularly violent ethnic group of a denomi-
national minority that has a long history of exclusion from governing coalitions,
we included dummies for each of these countries to make sure that their presence
was not driving any potential results. Summary statistics of the variables are listed
in Table 1.
Results
As our dependent variable is binary—whether or not a group engaged in terrorism in
an election year—it is appropriate to use logit regression to test our hypotheses, and
the results of the analysis are displayed in Table 2. They provide substantial support
for our first hypothesis and qualified support for the second one. In the best con-
trolled specifications (models 1–3, and 8), the greater the number of years since a
religious minority group has had access to the cabinet, the greater the likelihood that
it will engage in terrorism in an election year. Simply being of a different religion or
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Obs Mean SD Min Max
Terrorist attack by group 489 0.25 0.43 0 1
Years religious minority
has been out of cabinet
400 2.19 5.57 0 33
Years different denomination=sect
minority out of cabinet
400 1.24 6.31 0 57
Group years out of cabinet 400 7.71 11.19 0 57
Majority and minority of
different religion
637 0.33 0.47 0 1
Majority and minority same
religion, different branch
637 0.11 0.32 0 1
India 637 0.13 0.33 0 1
Sri Lanka 637 0.03 0.16 0 1
United Kingdom 637 0.04 0.21 0 1
Proportional representation 637 0.43 0.50 0 1
Mixed 637 0.12 0.33 0 1
Presidential 637 0.23 0.42 0 1
Semi-presidential 637 0.20 0.40 0 1
GDP per capita 628 8375.71 8061.10 334.42 39722.25
Aggregate growth of GDP per capita 623 2.12 6.26 20.88 60.39
Obs¼ observations.
Religion, Government Coalitions, and Terrorism 39
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:4
0 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
T
a
b
le
2
.
R
es
u
lt
s:
T
h
e
ef
fe
ct
o
f
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
a
cc
es
s
o
n
th
e
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
te
rr
o
ri
sm
b
y
et
h
n
ic
g
ro
u
p
V
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
Y
ea
rs
re
li
g
io
u
s
m
in
o
ri
ty
h
a
s
b
ee
n
o
u
t
o
f
ca
b
in
et
0
.1
0

0
.0
8

0
.1
2


0
.0
9

0
.1
3


0
.1
0

(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
Y
ea
rs
d
if
fe
re
n
t
b
ra
n
ch
m
in
o
ri
ty
o
u
t
o
f
ca
b
in
et
0
.1
6


0
.1
6


0
.1
5


0
.1
4


0
.1
5


0
.1
3


(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
4
)
(0
.0
5
)
(0
.0
5
)
Y
ea
rs
g
ro
u
p
o
u
t
o
f
ca
b
in
et
0
.0
1
6
0
.0
3
0
.0
5
0
.0
0
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
0
.0
1
–
0
.0
1
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
M
a
jo
ri
ty
a
n
d
m
in
o
ri
ty
o
f
d
if
fe
re
n
t
re
li
g
io
n
–
0
.7
8
–
0
.5
6
0
.0
1
0
.3
3
–
0
.5
2
–
0
.6
3
(0
.8
5
)
(0
.8
3
)
(0
.6
8
)
(0
.6
5
)
(0
.7
8
)
(0
.8
6
)
M
a
jo
ri
ty
a
n
d
m
in
o
ri
ty
sa
m
e
re
li
g
io
n
,
d
if
fe
re
n
t
b
ra
n
ch
–
2
.1
3
–
1
.9
1
–
2
.3
2

–
2
.4
8


–
2
.2
2

–
1
.2
1
(1
.3
1
)
(1
.3
0
)
(1
.0
1
)
(0
.8
9
)
(1
.2
5
)
(1
.1
3
)
In
d
ia
1
.1
2
1
.4
4
1
.2
7
1
.3
9
(1
.0
5
)
(1
.1
0
)
(1
.0
7
)
(0
.9
8
)
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
2
.6
2
2
.7
0
2
.3
7
2
.5
2
(1
.9
4
)
(1
.9
4
)
(1
.6
6
)
(1
.8
2
)
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
–
0
.4
9
4
1
.3
5
–
1
.1
8
0
.1
8
(1
.3
7
)
(1
.6
8
)
(1
.4
3
)
(1
.2
0
)
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
a
l
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
1
.1
6
1
.2
8
1
.2
4
0
.7
6
1
.1
3
(0
.9
1
)
(0
.9
2
)
(0
.9
3
)
(0
.6
1
)
(0
.7
3
)
40
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:4
0 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
M
ix
ed
–
0
.3
0
–
0
.2
3
–
0
.3
5
–
0
.8
8
0
.6
1
(1
.3
1
)
(1
.2
7
)
(1
.3
5
)
(1
.0
6
)
(1
.3
1
)
P
re
si
d
en
ti
a
l
–
1
.1
6
–
0
.9
6
–
1
.0
5
–
1
.5
0

–
1
.1
7
9
1
2
(0
.8
0
)
(0
.7
8
)
(0
.8
2
)
(0
.7
3
)
(0
.7
3
)
S
em
i-
p
re
si
d
en
ti
a
l
–
2
.4
8

–
2
.4
4

–
2
.3
6

–
1
.8
6

–
2
.6
7

(1
.0
8
)
(1
.1
0
)
(1
.0
1
)
(0
.7
9
)
(1
.1
7
)
G
D
P
p
er
ca
p
it
a
–
0
.0
1
–
0
.0
1
0
.0
0

0
.0
0

0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
(0
.0
0
)
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
g
ro
w
th
p
er
ca
p
it
a
0
.0
7


0
.0
7


0
.0
6


0
.0
7


0
.0
7

(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
2
)
(0
.0
3
)
(0
.0
3
)
T
im
e
si
n
ce
te
rr
o
ri
sm
b
y
g
ro
u
p
–
1
.3
6


(0
.3
0
)
T
im
e
si
n
ce
te
rr
o
ri
sm
b
y
g
ro
u
p
^2
0
.1
5


(0
.0
4
)
T
im
e
si
n
ce
te
rr
o
ri
sm
b
y
g
ro
u
p
^3
–
0
.0
0


(0
.0
0
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
–
1
.1
2
–
1
.5
9
–
1
.4
0
–
1
.1
8

–
1
.5
1


–
1
.0
3


–
0
.4
5
–
1
.3
6


(1
.0
2
)
(1
.0
2
)
(0
.9
8
)
(0
.4
7
)
(0
.4
4
)
(0
.3
1
)
(0
.6
2
)
(0
.3
0
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
8
9
2
8
9
2
8
9
2
9
7
2
9
7
2
9
7
2
8
9
2
8
9
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.

 p
<
.0
1
,

p
<
.0
5
,
 p
<
.1
.
41
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:4
0 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
sect has no effect nor does simply being excluded from the cabinet. When controlling
for institutions and unusual country effects, it is the combination of these two cri-
teria which make terrorist violence more likely. These results for the two main
explanatory variables are both substantively and statistically significant.75 Both
being of a different religion than the majority and being of a different denomination
or sect than the majority while also being excluded from the cabinet cause some ele-
ments of ethnic groups to be more likely to engage in terrorist violence. In model 8,
we use a cubic polynomial model76 to account for temporal autocorrelation and find
that the results are neither substantively nor statistically different from model 1 upon
which the following analysis is based.
Examining the predicted probabilities allows us to assess how the probability of
extremists engaging in terrorism varies the number of years an ethnic group is
excluded from the cabinet, whether or not it is a religious minority, and whether it
is excluded from the government. All of the predicted probabilities that we present
here were calculated using a method, which allows us to fix values for the variables
of interest, namely religious difference and denomination=sect difference, and to
vary the values of the control variables according to their true values to obtain more
accurate results.77 Groups of a different religion than the majority that have not been
excluded from the cabinet have a probability of 0.16 of engaging in terrorism, while
those that have been excluded for 33 years, the maximum for this category, have a
probability of 0.76 of engaging in terrorism as shown in Figure 1. Interestingly,
the initial likelihood of having elements of ethnic minority groups of the same reli-
gion as the majority engage in terrorist violence when not excluded from the govern-
ment (with a predicted probability of 0.24) is actually higher than that of a different
religion. However, while the likelihood of elements of excluded ethnic groups of the
same religion as the majority engaging in terrorist violence increases as the number
of years excluded increases, the rate is much lower than for groups of a different reli-
gion. When excluded from the cabinet for 57 years, the maximum for this category,
ethnic groups of the same religion as the majority have only a 0.41 probability of
being associated with terrorism.
Figure 1. Political access and the probability of terrorism by the ethnic group.
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Likewise, exclusion from the cabinet of ethnic groups that are of the same reli-
gion as the majority, but differ in terms of denomination or sect, also increases the
likelihood of terrorist violence, controlling for other variables. The predicted prob-
abilities are also useful for assessing the effect of duration of government exclusion
on the likelihood of terrorism for minorities of a different religious denomination or
sect as well as those of the same denomination or sect across the range of the vari-
able. When ethnic groups that differ in denomination or sect have not been excluded
from the cabinet, they have about a .06 probability of engaging in terrorism, which is
0.10 less than that of groups with a different religion that have not been excluded. In
looking at ethnic groups that are of the same denomination or sect as the majority,
their probability of some element engaging in terrorism is higher than both of the
different groups when not excluded from the cabinet, with a predicted probability
of 0.26—similar to that of same religion. However, as exclusion occurs, the prob-
ability of terrorist violence increases rapidly for groups with a different denomi-
nation or sect. When a minority ethnic group of a different denomination or sect
has been excluded from the cabinet for 57 years, the maximum for this variable in
this sample, it has a predicted probability of 0.99 of engaging in terrorism. When
a minority ethnic group of the same denomination or sect has been excluded from
the government for 57 years, its probability of being associated with terrorist
violence is only 0.41.
The predicted probabilities for these four cases are displayed in Figure 1.
Exclusion of both groups increases the likelihood of terrorist violence, with the rate
for groups of a different denomination or sect being greater than that for groups of a
different religion, consistent with our theory. Additionally, there also appears to be a
threshold effect for the excluded ethnic groups of a different sect or denomination.
Just past the mid-range of the variable, at about 33 years out of the cabinet, the
probability of terrorism is already at 0.84 and then increases to 0.99 over the remain-
ing 24 years represented.78 Conversely, the slope for the predicted probabilities for
ethnic groups of a different religion that are excluded from the cabinet engaging
in terrorism is much closer to linear, increasing more or less steadily over the range
of the variable which is 0–33 years. This lends support to our hypotheses, parti-
cularly the second one. While exclusion of both types of groups increases the likeli-
hood of terrorism, it would appear that excluded groups of a different sect or
denomination are more easily co-opted for violent action.
Exclusion of groups which share a religious affiliation with the majority,
whether of the same religion or same denomination or sect, does not have nearly
the same impact on the likelihood of terrorist violence. While there is a slightly posi-
tive change, groups of the same religion that are excluded from the cabinet for 57
years have about a 0.17 probability of having elements that engage in terrorist viol-
ence, while groups of the same denomination or sect that are excluded for 57 years
have about a 0.15 probability of being associated with terrorist violence. Unfortu-
nately, the conservative nature with which we have coded the dependent variable
and the problem of missing data preclude us from being able to judge the statistical
significance of this difference in probabilities for terrorism between groups of a dif-
ferent religion and groups of a different denomination or sect across the range of the
variables. However, the trend is clear from the graph and we propose that this is a
fruitful venue for further empirical study with more and better data.
In terms of the control variables, both presidential and semi-presidential systems
in both models generally decrease the likelihood that a group will engage in terrorism
Religion, Government Coalitions, and Terrorism 43
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as compared to a parliamentary system, although the coefficients do not reach stat-
istical significance in all of the models. The logic behind this finding is not theorized
here, but it may be that the groups perceive their inclusion or exclusion differently in
different systems and thus act or fail to act based on a different set of expectations.
Alternatively, it may be that the religious cleavage is less salient in presidential sys-
tems even when groups are excluded. From a limited examination of the data, it does
not appear that minority religious groups are more likely to be included in the cabi-
net in presidential or semi-presidential systems. Further research into this finding
may yield important insights but are beyond the scope of the current inquiry.
The type of electoral system, whether proportional representation, first-past-the-
post (comparison category), or some combination of the two (mixed), does not
appear to have an effect on the likelihood that ethnic groups adhering to a minority
religion or sect will engage in terrorism. Wealth is negatively related to domestic
terrorist attacks but only reaches statistical significance in some of the models.
Aggregate growth per capita, however, is statistically significant and positively
related to the probability of terrorist incidents across models. While personal poverty
is not thought to drive domestic terrorism, there is no consensus in the literature
about the effects of aggregate economic conditions on the probability of terrorism.79
Importantly, our sample only includes democracies with electorally active minorities
and is therefore not a representative sample with respect to the effect of economic
conditions on the incidence of terrorism in democracies or worldwide. Consequently,
we refrain from speculating and simply submit that this is an open venue for further
study.
Discussion and Conclusion
There has been much debate in recent years about the relationship between religion
and terrorism, most of it based on case studies. Moreover, the new terrorism litera-
ture has singled out Islam as a religion that breeds violence.80 Birnir, on the other
hand, argues that ethnic minorities are not inherently violent; it is grievances such
as the lack of access to legislative coalitions, which make minorities more likely to
rebel.81
We build on the theoretical insights of the new terrorism literature about the
motivational aspects of religion and incorporate key findings from the literature
on electoral politics. We propose that all minority religions provide an organiza-
tional platform that can be politicized by extremists under conditions of electoral
exclusion. Furthermore, drawing on the findings of the conflict literature, we suggest
that absolute religious distance is not the strongest minority motivator. Instead, we
maintain that where religion is a predominant minority identifier—as is often the
case where differences in denomination or sect distinguish a minority—the prob-
ability of extremist violence under conditions of political exclusion is augmented.
To empirically test our hypotheses, we explored how access to the government
by ethnic minorities that subscribe to a different religion than the majority popu-
lation and those that subscribe to a different denomination or sect of the same reli-
gion impacts the minority groups’ propensity to engage in terrorism. We find that in
both cases, lack of access to the cabinet increases the likelihood that minority groups
whose religion, denomination, or sect differs from the majority group will engage in
terrorism. In addition, we find that the probability of violence increases as the num-
ber of years the group is excluded increases. Looking at the extreme cases of the
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explanatory variable in the models highlights our findings: in the cases of groups
with a different religion than the majority, the group that was excluded for the great-
est number of years (33) was the Sri Lankan Tamils, while for different denomi-
nation, the group excluded the longest (57 years) was the Catholics in Northern
Ireland. These two groups have also had notoriously active terrorist wings.82
A somewhat surprising finding in our study is that ethnic groups of the same
religion, denomination, or sect have a higher initial likelihood of being associated
with terrorist violence when they are not excluded from the government than do
those whose religion, denomination, or sect differs. Additionally, minority ethnic
groups of a different denomination or sect than the majority have the lowest likeli-
hood of extremist elements engaging in terrorism when the group is not excluded.
Future research should explore these patterns more deeply by focusing on the
relationship between exclusion from legislative coalitions and the level of violence
in which groups engage in light of other grievances or incentives.
Our study of the relationship between religion, government inclusion, and the
incidence of terrorism is especially relevant for the literature on elections, party poli-
tics, and political violence. When they are excluded from government, certain mem-
bers of minority groups engage in violent strategies, including terrorism, to voice
their political demands. This, in turn, usually leads to further exclusion, which only
increases the likelihood that extremist elements will perpetrate terrorist attacks. This
spiral of conflict is one with which the civil conflict literature is all too familiar. In
her study of political parties in Israel, Navot argues that banning parties that have
violent factions only worsens the problem.83 Parties that do not find a legal outlet
for their frustration become further marginalized by the hardliners. In other words,
our findings suggest that the inclusion of minorities in the government might ameli-
orate terrorism in some cases. On the other hand, once groups become violent due to
political exclusion, banning minority parties and further excluding them from
government will likely exacerbate terrorist tendencies.
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Appendix: Summary of Countries and Groups included in the Analysis
Country Group
Different religious
family?
Different
branch?
Albania Greeks 1 0
Australia Aborigines 0 0
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tribes 1 0
Bangladesh Hindus 1 0
Belgium Francophones 0 0
Bolivia Indigenous Highland Peoples 1 0
Bolivia Lowland Indigenous Peoples 1 0
Bosnia Croats 1 0
Bosnia Muslims 0 0
Bosnia Serbs 1 0
Bulgaria Roma 0 0
Bulgaria Turks 1 0
Canada Quebecois 0 1
Colombia Blacks 0 0
Colombia Indigenous Peoples 0 0
Croatia Serbs 0 1
Czech Rep. Roma 0 0
Ecuador Indigenous Highland Peoples 0 0
Estonia Russians 0 1
Finland Swedish-Speaking 0 0
Georgia Abkhazians 1 0
Germany Turks 1 0
Ghana Ashanti 0 0
Greece Muslims 1 0
Hungary Roma 0 0
India Assamese 0 0
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Country Group
Different religious
family?
Different
branch?
India Kashmiris 1 0
India Mizos 1 0
India Muslims 1 0
India Nagas 1 0
India Scheduled Castes 0 0
India Scheduled Tribes 0 0
India Sikhs 1 0
Indonesia Chinese 1 0
Israel Arabs 1 0
Israel Russians 0 0
Italy Sardinians 0 0
Italy South Tyrolians 0 0
Latvia Russians 0 1
Lithuania Russians 0 0
Macedonia Albanians 1 0
Macedonia Roma 0 0
Macedonia Serbs 0 0
Madagascar Merina 0 0
Malawi Lomwe 0 0
Malawi Nyanja-Speakers 0 0
Malawi Tumbuka-Speakers 0 0
Malawi Yao 1 0
Moldova Gagauz 0 0
Moldova Slavs 0 0
Namibia Basters 0 0
Namibia East Caprivians 0 0
Namibia Europeans 0 0
Nepal Terai 1 0
Nepal Tibeto-Burman 1 0
New Zealand Maori 0 0
Nigeria Ibo 1 0
Nigeria Yoruba 0 0
Pakistan Baluchis 0 0
Pakistan Mohajirs 0 0
Pakistan Pashtuns (Pushtuns) 0 0
Pakistan Sindhis 0 0
Peru Indigenous Highland Peoples 0 0
Poland Germans 0 0
Romania Magyars (Hungarians) 0 1
Romania Roma 0 0
S Korea Honamese 0 0
Slovakia Hungarians 0 1
Slovakia Roma 0 0
South Africa Asians 1 0
South Africa Black Africans 0 0
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Country Group
Different religious
family?
Different
branch?
South Africa Coloreds 0 0
South Africa Europeans 0 0
South Africa Xhosa 0 0
South Africa Zulus 0 0
Spain Basques 0 0
Spain Catalans 0 0
Sri Lanka Indian Tamils 1 0
Sri Lanka Sri Lankan Tamils 1 0
Switzerland French 0 0
Switzerland Italian 0 0
Thailand Chinese 0 0
Thailand Malay-Muslims 1 0
Trinidad Tobago African Descent 0 1
Trinidad Tobago Indian Descent 1 0
Turkey Kurds 0 0
UK Afro-Caribbeans 0 0
UK Catholics In N. Ireland 0 1
UK Scots 0 0
Ukraine Russians 0 0
USA African Americans 0 0
USA Asian Americans 1 0
USA Hispanic 0 1
Venezuela Indigenous Peoples 1 0
Yugoslavia Kosovo Albanians 1 0
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